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Abstract
Natural hazards can considerably impact the overall society of a coun-
try. As some degree of public sector involvement is always necessary to
deal with the consequences of natural disasters, central governments have
increasingly invested in proactive risk management planning. In order to
empower and involve the whole society, some countries have established
public-private partnerships, mainly with the insurance industry, with sat-
isfactorily outcomes. Although they have proven necessary and most often
effective, the public-private initiatives have often incurred high debts or
have failed to achieved the desired risk reduction objectives. We review
the role of these partnerships in the management of natural risks, with
particular attention to the insurance sector. Among other country-specific
issues, poor risk knowledge and weak governance have widely challenged
the initiatives during the recent years, while the future is threatened by the
uncertainty of climate change and unsustainable development. In order to
strengthen the country’s resilience, a greater involvement of all segments
of the community, especially the weakest layers, is needed and the man-
agement of natural risks should be included in a sustainable development
plan.
1 Introduction
Natural risks pose a broad range of social, financial and economic issues, with
potentially long-lasting effects. Historically, governments have mostly addressed
the financial effects of natural events on an ad-hoc basis, but, since the 1970s, a
strong awareness-raising activity by the United Nations has profoundly changed
the attitude of the national authorities.1 According to the United Nations, all
governments should not just guide citizens toward recovery in the aftermath
1 The United Nations dates the beginning of the global disaster risk reduction process to
the International Expert Group Meeting in July 1979, but the first International Framework
of Action - the international Decade for Disaster Reduction - began 10 years later, on January
1990. Then framework has then been followed by the Yokohama Strategy in 1994. In 1999
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of an event, but prepare them and create the conditions necessary to ensure
rapid resilience. To this aim, OECD, G20 (OECD, 2012), the World Bank and
GFDRR (World Bank, 2014), encourage countries to adopt a comprehensive
disaster risk management strategy, which should be articulated in a series of
coherent and coordinated actions, well distributed and defined over time and
aimed at addressing a specific phase of the disaster. In particular, the strategy
must include risk assessment, risk reduction, preparedness, emergency response,
and recovery.
Among these phases, all equally important, risk reduction is by far the most
complex to plan. Many tools able to reducing the financial impact of natural
events exist, and can be divided into three categories based on how the risk is
addressed. We distinguish between risk mitigation, risk retention and risk trans-
fer. Mitigating risks means acting on the physical and environmental conditions
responsible for the financial impact, therefore all structural interventions aimed
at decreasing the probability of an event occurring (e.g. reservoirs), the vulner-
ability of exposed assets (e.g. retrofitting on private homes) or the number of
goods and individuals exposed (e.g. restricting building permission in high-risk
areas) fall into the first category. Since risks cannot be completely mitigated
and structural interventions might not be cost-effective (Hudson et al., 2016),
a good risk management strategy should always include some degree of finan-
cial protection (World Bank, 2014). Financial instruments2 for risk reduction
can distribute the costs over time by accumulating sufficient capital to face the
expected losses of future events (risk retention), or transfer the risk to special-
ized subjects, i.e. insurers and reinsurers, or to the market through catastrophe
the United Nations established the UNDRR (United Nation office for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion), a secretariat dedicated to facilitate the implementation of the “International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction”. The office presented a first plan - the “Hyogo Framework for Action
2005-2015” (United Nations, 2005) - to explain, describe and detail the work that is required
from all different sectors and actors to reduce disaster losses. When the framework reached
maturity, a 15-year-long, voluntary, non-binding agreement aiming at “the substantial reduc-
tion of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical,
social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries”
- the “Sendai Framework” (UNISDR, 2015) - was adopted by UN Member States. A series
of agreements - the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement on climate change, the New Urban
Agenda, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Agenda for Humanity - then sought to co-
ordinate risk reduction with the other global challenges. Other international organizations are
also involved in similar projects for the prevention, mitigation and management of natural dis-
aster risk, such as ADB (Asian Development Bank), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations), OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development)
and the World Bank. For example, in 2012, G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Gov-
ernors, along with G20 Leaders mandated the OECD to develop a voluntary framework for
strengthen disaster risk assessment and financing (OECD, 2012).
2Two approaches to risk financing exist and correspond to different financial instruments.
Risks might be addressed ex post by means of existing resources and powers, or ex ante with
financial mechanisms explicitly arranged or secured beforehand. For example, ex ante instru-
ments that governments can rely on are reserve funds, contingent credit facilities, re/insurance,
catastrophe-linked securities. Examples of ex post financing are budget reallocation, debt
financing, borrowing and taxation. Note that ex post financing does not preclude the es-
tablishment of institutional arrangements that specify, ex ante, the government’s financial
commitments (OECD, 2012).
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linked securities. Both risk retention and transfer facilitate emergency response
and speed up recovery by providing resources in the immediate aftermath of an
event.
The governments not only should select and adopt the most suitable risk
reduction measures, but must also ensure that individuals have access to them.
Since private insurance on buildings and/or on other movable assets is the main
risk financing tool for businesses and households, the OECD (2012) recommends
that governments “assess their availability, adequacy and efficiency to the pop-
ulation and within the economy, as well as their costs and benefits relative to
other types of possible risk reduction measures”. Nevertheless, a series of market
failures endanger financial and insurance markets3 and makes it necessary to fur-
ther reduce the risks before transferring them. In this respect, governments have
often intervened by investing in risk mitigation and increasing public awareness
among the population. In some cases, when the costs of policies were pro-
hibitive for some segments of the population, the authorities directly intervened
in the insurance market by establishing a public-private partnership. Though
in some circumstances efforts of governments have already been substantial, the
Geneva Association (2018) expects the role of the insurance industry to become
increasingly relevant in the next future and urges governments to increase their
commitment in monitoring socio-economic risks of climate change, developing
risk management plans for all sectors of the economy, and establishing relevant
public-private partnerships with insurers to enhance socio-economic resilience.
The fragility of the insurance industry is only part of the problem facing
countries. Governments themselves are in fact significantly exposed to disas-
ter risk: public exposures are large, including human losses, injuries, damage to
public goods, tax pressures resulting from financial commitments and unplanned
post-disaster financial assistance, as well as potentially negative changes in
macroeconomic conditions such as possible lower economic growth or lower tax
revenues.4 In order to protect the national financial stability, the Sendai Frame-
3Main market failures in disaster risk management relate to the insurability of risks, infor-
mation asymmetry, adverse selection, consumer behavior, moral hazard and charity hazard.
As far as insurability concerns, spatial correlation among insured assets constitutes a central
issue for disaster management because generates the potential for enormous losses to the in-
surers (Glauber, 2004). For example, a series of hurricanes in the US during the 1990s led
to a consistent number of insolvencies (Matthews et al., 1999; Mills et al., 2001). As a conse-
quence, insurance included higher risk-load in premium rating for high-risk areas (Feldblum,
1990; Kreps, 1990; Meyers, 1996; Mango, 1997, 1998; Kreps, 1998), that often do not meet
the demand from rational purchaser (Kousky and Cooke, 2012). Along with behavioural bias
(Kunreuther, 1996), climate change further complicates the development of financial and in-
surance market. The Geneva Association (2013) warns that return periods and correlation
among claims for several high-loss extreme events are “ambiguous rather than simply uncer-
tain”, and raises concerns about the future sustainability of insurance business on natural
risks. Failures in capital markets have been explored by Froot (2001), that found that securi-
tization is not always the lowest-cost way to transfer risk due to supply restrictions associated
with capital market imperfections and market power exerted by traditional reinsurers.
4Losses that the government may incur can be both explicit or implicit: the expenses that
could derive from the reconstruction of public goods and infrastructures or other financial
commitments following a disaster are explicit; on the contrary, expenses that do not reflect
any type of commitment or liability, but which can still occur due to a perceived obligation
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work claims that the government, while guaranteeing social assistance, should
share responsibilities with private stakeholders and therefore private initiatives
in prevention and financial protection should be encouraged. As emphasized by
the OECD (2015), improving public awareness reduces the human-induced fac-
tors that make a major contribution to the cost of disasters and alleviates losses
on public finances. However, educating and informing the society is usually not
enough.
Hence, if some degree of government involvement is necessary to protect
the most vulnerable layers of the society and the market, how can authorities
balance public and private initiatives? According to Jaffee and Russell (2013),
public initiatives should only complement private activities and the role that the
government should assume depends on the relationship between objective and
subjective probabilities of loss. In case of perfectly rational individuals with
objective perception of risk, an active role of government is necessary during
emergency response only; if individuals underestimate their risk, investments
in public awareness are needed or, alternatively, mandatory insurance purchase
might be introduced. Whether other differences between objective and subjec-
tive probabilities are not generated from behavioural biases, the government
should identify and implement the solution that addresses the specific market
failure in the most efficient way.
Unfortunately, identifying market failures is complicated. To make matters
worse, “with increasing complexity and interaction of human, economic and
political systems within ecological systems, risk becomes increasingly systemic”
(UNDRR, 2019), and responsibilities increasingly blurred. In increasingly un-
certain and complex contexts, cooperation between all the subjects involved -
individuals, businesses, authorities - is essential to build the community’s re-
silience. Although most countries are still not adequately prepared to deal
with the consequences of possible future disasters5, some have already imple-
mented sophisticated risk management plans which envisage a public-private
partnership with the insurance sector. Almost all of these few virtuous coun-
tries have intervened in the insurance sector, becoming insurers, reinsurers or, in
the poorest economies, by activating micro-insurances. These partnerships are
then supported and strengthened by governments through a series of legislative
provisions and investments, which make each strategy unique. Although it is not
possible to replicate any of these strategies in other countries, some useful lesson
can still be drawn from them. In the next section the main public-private part-
nerships currently in force are analyzed. The benefits of these partnerships are
widely recognized, but some important weaknesses have also emerged, which
we discuss in section 3. Among these, risk understanding and government’s
attitude toward natural risks are today the two major limits in disaster risk
management. Many of these weaknesses can be overcome by adopting an even
are implicit.
5According to the report by Wilkinson et al. (2017), a number of disaster risk management
activities were conducted during the past decades (most of which were relatively low cost),
but, however, they were not as effective as they could and disaster losses increased during the
Hyogo Framework of Action.
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more inclusive approach, which involves a greater number of subjects and there-
fore allows to monitor the risk on the whole society. For these reasons, UNDRR
(2019) argues that countries should move towards a community-based approach
to risk management, and section 4 deals with this. To conclude, section 5 discuss
the next challenges in disaster risk management.
2 Public-Private Partnership in Insurance
There is a widespread agreement on the benefits of public-private partner-
ships for the management of natural disasters (Kunreuther, 2006b; World Bank,
2012b; Shukla et al., 2019) and in particular, public intervention in the insur-
ance sector is increasingly proving to be effective, especially in the poorest
countries. Government-supported initiatives are in fact able to distribute risks
and losses over the entire population and over time (Kunreuther and Pauly,
2006), and are much more flexible than private solutions as they are not tied to
profit objectives (Penning-Rowsell, 2015). When insurance schemes are prop-
erly designed and supported, they communicate risk to the population, foster
adaptive responses and risk reduction and above all improve economic stabil-
ity and protect the well-being of the community (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006;
Lotze-Campen and Popp, 2012; Hudson et al., 2016; Kunreuther and Lyster, 2016;
Kousky et al., 2018; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2019). As argued by Bruggeman et al.
(2010), however, public intervention are beneficial only if they solve a specific
market failure that the private sector is not able to cope with on its own. Other-
wise, the State’s entry into the insurance (or reinsurance) market might play a
distorting effect. Unfortunately, identifying and recognizing the market failure
may not be easy.
Provided that the public intervention is necessary, the effectiveness of the
insurance system depends on a number of conditions. First of all, it is essential to
achieve a satisfactory understanding of the natural phenomenon and the extent
of the losses to which it can lead. In particular, capturing the spatial correlation
that binds insured properties is fundamental as it challenges the rating process
and, in turn, the financial stability of the system, as happened for example in
the U.S. corn insurance market (Woodard et al., 2012). Secondly, the business
should be supported by a coordinated set of actions aimed at overcoming all the
frictions that generate low take up rates, such as lack of trust in the institution,
liquidity constraints, and limited salience among citizens (Cole et al., 2013).
Educating the population has often fostered the adoption of policies (Bogale,
2015; Gan et al., 2014), and income and development support measures proved
effective in some circumstances (Greatrex et al., 2015; McIntosh et al., 2013).
If this is not sufficient, mandatory insurance purchase tackles the root problem
(Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006), though this solution may not be well received by
citizens. Furthermore, raising awareness of the population on natural disasters
in quiet periods is also decisive, as the prolonged absence of major events leads to
lowered attention and decreases policy’s purchase (Gan et al., 2014; Gallagher,
2014).
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In this section we present and discuss the three fundamental types of public-
private-partnership in the insurance business - public insurance, public reinsur-
ance, and micro-insurance -, how governments have implemented them and the
difficulties they encountered.
2.1 State-owned Insurance
When a peril has a potential high economic impact in a given area, insurance
companies may fear for their financial stability and therefore decide to limit the
offer or to provide coverage at an excessively high price in that area. If the
area is large and the number of individuals and uncovered properties is high,
the lack of insurers becomes a huge problem for the government as citizens
might demand for public intervention in the aftermath of an event. When fac-
ing this situation, some countries reputed offering policies at a price affordable
for all citizens more efficient than deploying capital in ex post relief programs
(Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006) and have therefore established a state-owned in-
surance company. As public companies aim at solving gaps, coverage is provided
for perils that cannot be borne by private companies only. In fact, most of the
schemes deal with a single peril, such as earthquakes in California or Turkey,
or with a restricted set of them. Insurable items are also limited: coverage is
usually provided only for buildings, sometimes even for vehicles, while other
risks, such as business interruptions, are rarely covered.
Table 1 describes the main public insurance against natural disasters cur-
rently in place. Most of these companies were born out of heated debate between
insurers operating in the area and the national authorities, and are supported
by both. Sometimes the role of the private sector is limited to technical ad-
vice during the creation of the public program and to data provision, other
times the public company shares the risks with the private ones through co-
insurance. Furthermore, private companies almost always act as intermediaries
between citizens and the public company by underwriting policies and transfer-
ring risks and the related premiums to the state-owned entity in exchange for a
fee. Governments typically support the public company by assuming the role of
guarantor in exchange of a charge (e.g. EQC in New Zealand) or for free (e.g.
Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros in Spain). Alternatively, governments
may provide a prearranged facilitated access to credit, as in the case of the Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). In addition, State-owned companies
may also benefit of contingent credit lines from international organizations such
as the World Bank.
Since the main purpose of government pools is to give the chance to most of
the population to get insured, the policies are sold at a low price or at least at a
premium lower than that offered by private companies. This choice has two im-
portant drawbacks. First, the low premiums of the public insurer can compete
with the few private companies that have decided to offer the policy, generating
a crowding out effect and weakening the private sector (McAneney et al., 2016).
Second, if low rates are not actuarially sound, they expose public insurers to
a risk of reserve depleting higher than that legally allowed to traditional in-
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surers. In addition, governments often apply flat premium rates that include
subsidy among individuals, but fail to create risk-reflecting reserves. Low rates
therefore make government guarantees or other forms of public financial sup-
port necessary to the sustenance of the program but, in order to limit public
capital injections, the pool should ideally become self-sustained at a certain
time. To this aim, governments can reduce the risk beared by the company
by encouraging and committing communities to risk mitigation (Kunreuther,
2006a, 2015). Building codes and premium discounts for properties subjected
to structural strengthening interventions have been extensively adopted, albeit
with varying results. The risk reduction is in fact largely demanded to citizens,
who may consider the investment not advantageous (Kleindorfer et al., 2005),
and therefore countries that have applied more binding risk mitigation plans
have obtained greater participation.
The company’s financial exposure can then be reduced by applying de-
ductibles to the policies or transferring the risks through reinsurance. Both
components are important: the former preserves a certain degree of citizens’ re-
sponsibility; the latter allows the State-owned company to get rid of the higher
losses by transferring them to specialized bodies or on international markets, so
as not to unduly affect the insurance reserves and public resources following a
catastrophic event (OECD, 2018b). In particular, as risks evolve rapidly and
disasters become more and more frequent, reinsurance is essential for public
companies to survive (Seo, 2004).
Although all the schemes in Table 1 are profoundly different from each other,
any of them requires four elements to properly function: strong government fi-
nancial support, a great commitment to risk reduction, high citizen participation
and ongoing access to the reinsurance market. Since State-owned insurances are
just a few and some of them are extremely young, it is difficult to outline how
to properly balance the four components. However, the history of NFIP, which
is one of the oldest and most studied public insurance programs, has shown how
decisive these components are.6
6NFIP is a public insurance program for flooding in the U.S. and provides policies only if
the community joined a floodplains laws and ordinances program. The program applies risk-
based premiums (although some subsidy was introduced in 2014 with the Homeowners Flood
Insurance Affordability Act) defined on the flood maps. In order to better capture the real risk
of the different areas, the government committed to update and complete the flood risk maps.
The program has been hardly criticized because rates did not provide the necessary income to
build long-term reserves (US General Accounting Office, 2001) and flood mapping process was
not so effective and timely as planned (Kousky and Kunreuther, 2014). In addition, NFIP was
not authorized to secure private reinsurance until the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform
Act of 2012 and the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014. Although rates
have been updated several times, the program reached the statutory borrowing cap from
the Treasury in September 2017. The U.S. Congress cancelled more than half of the debt,
but NFIP had to borrow additional capital two months later. The company’s outstanding
debt is currently $20.5 billion and is likely to grow as its annual probable maximum loss
is over $40 billion and its capacity to pay claims without borrowing is $5.4 billion (FEMA,
2020). As extreme rainfall along the Gulf Coast are on the rise (van Oldenborgh et al., 2017),
it therefore seems very unlikely that the program will be able to resist without the strong
support of the State. Moreover, unless reauthorized or amended by the Congress, the NFIP’s
borrowing limit from the Treasury will be reduced from $30.425 billion to $1 billion at the
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Voluntary citizen participation is the most common issue in natural disaster
insurance and, despite favorable cost, most State-owned insurances record low
take up rates also. Undesired consequences of low insurance penetration are po-
tentially high costs of government’s post-disaster assistance (Dixon et al., 2006),
and reduced access to the reinsurance market for the insurer (von Lucius, 2004).
There are several reasons why the population exhibits careless behavior towards
natural disasters’ prevention, but state-owned insurances seem particularly af-
fected by charity hazard (Gurenko et al., 2006; Raschky and Weck-Hannemann,
2007; Bas¸bug˘-Erkan and Yilmaz, 2015; Marshall, 2018). The belief that the gov-
ernment will help irrespective of owning an insurance policy is stronger when
governmental relief is more certain (Raschky et al., 2013), and States offering
a public-private insurance have usually been very generous to the community
when hit by a disaster. Along with charity hazard, low risk perception and poor
policy understanding are also quite frequent (Chivers and Flores, 2002). Intro-
ducing mandatory insurance purchase can rise take up rates (Kunreuther and Pauly,
2006; Kriesel and Landry, 2004), provided that the obligation is properly for-
mulated and monitored (Dixon et al., 2006). For example, in Turkey, property-
owners are required to prove to have valid policy only when they want to buy
or sell a house or to obtain a new account for water and electricity services.
As argued by Bas¸bug˘-Erkan and Yilmaz (2015), this sporadic check does not
enforce ongoing renewal of the insurance. The Turkish government has there-
fore activated some initiatives aimed at promoting awareness, many of which
have been designed so that the most sensitive citizens involve an increasing
number of acquaintances. For example, a 20 percent premium discount is of-
fered if eight individual apartment unit owners from the same apartment com-
plex jointly take out a policy, and is supporting the growth of a large volunteer
and civil society network (Bas¸bug˘-Erkan and Yilmaz, 2015; World Bank, 2019).
As frequent monitoring mandatory requirement might be expensive, extending
the policy validity to multi-years might also help (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2011b;
Kleindorfer et al., 2012).
Along with scarce participation of the citizens, State-owned companies should
also deal with all the problems traditionally affecting insurers. First of all, ade-
quate risk assessment might be extremely challenging where historic losses are
not available. An insurance scheme might be hence designed based on sim-
ulation techniques, as in the case of the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool
(Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2011), but this brings additional uncertainty to the
estimates (Bas¸bug˘-Erkan and Yilmaz, 2015; Cakti et al., 2006). The sensitivity
of the cost of reimbursements to changes in market prices or the reconstruction of
homes should also be taken into account when constructing reserves. For exam-
end of September 2020. Although late access to reinsurance and low premiums have certainly
played a role in the NFIP’s debt accumulation, part of the financial weakness of the program
is due to the insufficient participation of the communities. In general, individuals have not
invested enough in risk mitigation and the government has not been able to identify the
right stimuli. A more frequent remapping and the consequent adjustment of the premiums
could have helped to spread awareness and encourage private investments (Michel-Kerjan,
2010; Kousky and Kunreuther, 2014). Along with insufficient risk mitigation, NFIP has also
recorded low take up rates (Dixon et al., 2006).
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ple, in New Zealand, the State-owned insurance EQC operates in co-insurance
with the private sector and pays its reimbursement quota to the insured along
with the traditional insurer. After the Christchurch earthquake sequence in
2011, different private companies met their obligation at different times (some
even took more than 5 years) and, since the reimbursement provided by EQC is
equal to the cost of rebuilding the home, the cost of the event on the company’s
reserves was strongly affected by the market price variation of both construc-
tion works and materials (Wood et al., 2016). At last, State-owned insurance
companies face additional transaction and administrative expenses compared to
private companies, which can also be very high. (Marshall, 2018; Michel-Kerjan,
2010).
2.2 Public Reinsurance
Some countries faced great natural risks with an underdeveloped insurance in-
dustry that was not solid enough to manage the potential losses of the entire
population. In order to strengthen the private insurance sector and foster its
growth, a few governments established a State-administered reinsurance com-
pany to which insurers can or must transfer natural risks undermining their
financial stability (some examples are reported in Table 2). Compared to pro-
viding a State guarantee to insurers, this strategy preserves individual respon-
sibilities and requires the participation of all individuals who contribute to the
creation of the financial exposure as the cost of reinsurance is charged on the
final price of the policy (Bruggeman et al., 2010).
The characteristics and problems of public reinsurance are very similar to
those of State-owned insurances. First, the premium paid for reinsurance is typ-
ically low because the authorities want the insurers to keep citizens’ premiums
low. However, this solution is disproportionately beneficial for insurers which,
unless otherwise required by law, are free to apply the rating mechanism they
want. For this reason, some government-reinsurers fixed the property-owners’
premiums by legislative decree and/or obliged insurers to offer the policy. In
particular, policies for natural disasters are often compulsorily included in other
basic policies, the purchase of which may be mandatory for property-owners. In
general, this has led to satisfactorily high insurance penetration rates. However,
low reinsurance premiums may also challenge the Company’s financial stability,
as happened to the French Casse Centrale de Reassurance (CCR) in 1999.7
In order to ease financial pressure, governments often include risk mitiga-
tion in the State’s risk management plan, although the measures envisaged have
not always been effective. In addition to the difficulties in incentivizing private
investments in risk reduction, in many countries the greatest obstacle to risk
reduction activities have been the government’s own management objectives. In
7In France, the publicly owned reinsurance company Casse Centrale de Reassurance (CCR)
hit bankruptcy in 1999 due to too low fees and too much confidence in the unlimited State
guarantee (Vallet, 2004; Bruggeman et al., 2010). Measures were then taken which changed
the conditions of the subscription. There is also concern for the young Flood Re in the UK,
which seems to generate strong pressure on public finances (Surminski, 2018).
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France, for example, when the mandatory insurance requirement came into force
and the CCR was instituted, the flood risk mitigation measures required clashed
with the growth interests of the local authorities and consequently were not im-
plemented properly (Vallet, 2004). In the UK, instead, the government does not
seem to actually encourage risk reduction despite it is required by the agree-
ment signed with the insurers (Surminski and Eldridge, 2014; Penning-Rowsell,
2015; Surminski, 2018). In Florida, the Florida Catastrophe Insurance Fund
was launched to encourage urban growth but, according to Seo (2004), this in-
creased the risk exposure over time powered by climate change. In 2009, to
decrease exposure, the government has hence activated a program for gradual
privatisation of its risk, which also introduced the adoption of retrocession lines
and insurance-linked securities (ILS). In this respect, retrocession is proving
increasingly important to ensure the continuity of public reinsurance due to
climate change and the slow progress in risk mitigation.
To date, the strength of probably the most stable public reinsurance system
in place, the Japan Earthquake Reinsurance Co., is due to a combination of all
the revised elements: an adequate risk preparedness and mitigation, a strong
political leadership, a structured risk retrocession plan, and the simplicity of
the policies that has favored adoption by citizens (Takeda, 2004).
2.3 Micro-insurance
In the poorest countries, natural disasters generate far more complex social
issues than in developed ones, such as malnutrition, school dropouts, increased
poverty. Moreover, the risk of natural disasters can slow down the development
of these countries, as farmers are more reluctant to invest in new cultivation
techniques that can potentially boost productivity in the long run but might
generate greater loss in case of a disaster (World Bank, 2014). In these contexts,
insurance can help safeguarding productivity and, potentially, economic growth.
However, the poorest have hardly access to risk transfer.
The reasons for the low (or absent) penetration of insurance markets in this
segment of the population are manifold and are only partially related to the
supply side. In fact, if on the one hand the insurers often fail to assess the risk
in these territories due to the lack of historical data, on the other the individuals
are very reluctant to purchase. Several studies on African and Asian regions have
in fact brought to light a strong distrust of population towards the companies
that offer insurance or the institutions that support them (Cole et al., 2012b;
Greatrex et al., 2015).
In this complex context, international organizations, especially the World
Bank, and local or national governments have begun to adopt several form of
micro-insurance, especially index-based insurance. An index-based (or index-
linked) insurance is an insurance policy whose payout is triggered by an easily-
measured event, represented through an index, typically concerning weather
conditions (e.g. rainfall below a certain level). Index-based insurance are usu-
ally applied to agricultural risks and many initiatives have been activated by
local governments in several regions of Africa and Asia. A great advantage
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of these tools is that they do not need information on individual losses, but
only weather or environmental data which are more easily available and less
expensive to monitor. For the same reason, the compensation mechanism is
far more transparent, thus preventing moral hazard and facilitating the access
to reinsurance market for the insurer (Alderman and Haque, 2007; Cole et al.,
2012b).
The main issue related to index-linked insurance is basis risk: it is possi-
ble that an individual receives a payment when he has not suffered losses or
that he does not receive it against a large loss. In this regard, various solu-
tions for fine tuning indexes have been proposed in the literature, the main
ones being the use of early warnings and seasonal forecasting in the payout
triggering mechanism and the definition of complex indices incorporating multi-
ple climatic measurements and built on a better geographical granularity (Rao,
2010; Daron and Stainforth, 2014; Dercon et al., 2014; Conradt et al., 2015).
On the demand side, however, frictions are related to non-economic fac-
tors, including levels of financial literacy, liquidity, distrust (Cole et al., 2012b;
Eling et al., 2014; Bogale, 2015; Greatrex et al., 2015). Cole et al. (2012b) found
a positive effect of involving non-governmental organisations on take up rates,
though the impact differs depending on their reputation. The organisation staff
might help overcoming distrust and spreading knowledge of the products. In-
vesting in financial literacy and training courses is also highly recommended
(Cole et al., 2012b; World Bank, 2005), though empirical evidence is confusing
(Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012; Cole et al., 2012b; Bogale, 2015).
In addition to the difficulties in defining the instruments and the poor grip on
the demand, other factors challenge the future of index-linked securities. First,
many of these initiatives are supported by the authorities through vouchers
or remittances and this support is essential to allow the establishment of the
insurance scheme. However, if the system fails to develop properly and does
not become profitable to the provider, it is likely that the insurer will stop
offering the policy (Alderman and Haque, 2007). Further uncertainties concern
the future affordability of the policies. Siebert (2016) notes in fact that the
premiums in the Sahel region are extremely sensitive to the climatic parameters
of the model and this could lead to a considerable increase in prices in high-risk
areas - an increasingly likely scenario, given the strong effects of climate change
on weather events. Hence, in order for micro-insurance to continue, an effort
from the public sector is still needed (Cole, 2015). Governments will have both
to invest in facilitating access to risk transfer to the poorest, and to incentivize
companies to keep offering policies and innovate index-linked insurances.
3 Failures
Some theoretical study show that public-private partnerships are able to offer a
more efficient level of natural-catastrophe insurance than free markets (Burby,
2001; Charpentier and Le Maux, 2014) but a series of deficit characterizes the
history of government pools. In this respect, McAneney et al. (2016) argues that
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“Government pools usually contain an inherent contradiction in trying to provide
low cost insurance to high-risk properties and so the funding of deficits to which
they are inevitably prone becomes important”. Fat-tails and spatial correlation
make aggregate losses extremely volatile and also contribute to insolvencies
(Kousky and Cooke, 2009, 2012). Moreover, most of the government supported
insurance apply flat premium rates that do not reflect the asset’s riskiness. This
choice may be motivated by economic arguments (Hallegatte, 2011), but might
fail to provide the necessary income to build long-term reserves.
Public-private insurers can in principle minimise losses by encouraging risk
mitigation (Kunreuther, 2006a, 2015), but little evidence about this can be
found in practice. In particular, insurance companies try to encourage risk
mitigation by offering discounted policies. However, in order for this initiative to
be successful, insurers must have the opportunity to apply risk-based premiums
(Kunreuther, 2015) or, if the government demands a form of subsidy in the
rating, the authorities must actively engage in risk mitigation, for example by
outlining well-enforced building codes that force property owners to adopt cost-
effective protective mechanisms (Kunreuther, 2003). However, defining effective
rules on construction and policy purchase and enforcing them has often proved
practically difficult and not always in line with the other management objectives
of the local authorities.
Alternatively, strengthening the business by adopting new forms of reinsur-
ance coverage can protect insurers against potential insolvency from disasters
too (Kunreuther, 1996; Lee and Yu, 2007) and for this reason the ILS market has
significantly grown in the last decades (Cummins, 2007, 2008; Cummins and Barrieu,
2012). Despite this, the ILS market is still relatively young and countries are
often reluctant to adopt these securities because they usually lack experts who
can oversee their construction and issuance (OECD, 2010; Michel-Kerjan et al.,
2011a).8 In addition to lack of technical knowledge, the development of the ILS
market could also be hindered by the crowding out effect9 that governments
involved in the free market exert on more efficient private reinsurance solutions
(Cummins, 2006).
According to UNDRR (2019), to date countries have “patchy” implemented
their risk management strategies. Most are addressing the consequences of
disasters rather than trying to reduce their actual risk. The great weaknesses of
the national strategies currently in place and the reasons that led to a too slow
development of proactive strategies at the national level can all be traced back
to two major problems: insufficient risk understanding and weak governance
(Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019).
8In order to incentivize the adoption of catastrophe-bonds, in 2009 the World Bank has
launched the MultiCat program, in which it offers its technical support and act as an arranger.
In the same year, Mexico benefited from the program and issued a US$290 million cat bond
with a three-year maturity (World Bank, 2013).
9The crowding out effect of public programs refers to all those situations in which
government-supported initiatives meant to cover the uninsured prompt those already enrolled
in private insurance to switch to the public program.
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3.1 Risk Understanding
The effectiveness of risk management policies strongly depends on the ability
to identify and assess the risks (UNISDR, 2017). Knowing the probability of
occurrence of the events and their potential impacts10 constitutes the basis for
developing and evaluating the whole range of risk management strategies, such
as emergency plans or cost-benefit analysis11 of risk reduction measures. It
also allows the decision-making process to develop skills to be adapted to local
risk profiles and the social conditions of the communities involved, promoting
awareness of potential risks among the society. A well-established collection of
data on risks, exposures, vulnerabilities and expected losses is fundamental for
the success of any risk management strategy (Kunreuther, 2003).
Both the Hyogo and the Sendai Frameworks have underlined the importance
of risk understanding and, in turn, of data collection and risk assessment. Since
then, substantial progress was made, but, nevertheless, major gaps still affect
many countries (UNISDR, 2017). In particular, UNDRR (2019) identifies four
challenges about data on risks: availability, quality, accessibility and applica-
tion. Availability concerns data collection, a necessary step for risk assessment.
Understanding natural risks requires an enormous amount of information that
are costly to collect and, in addition, natural disasters are rare events and there-
fore creating a database requires time, at least decades. Along with long times
of observation, high-quality data is necessary to guarantee effective analysis.
Insurers and reinsurers are among the major data producers in the world in
terms of both dimensions and quality of their databases, but they are usually
not keen to share their database. Data accessibility strongly limits the analysis
of natural riskiness, and is not confined to private entities as several countries
show difficulties in data-sharing among government institutions. However, ac-
cessing to a high-quality database is not sufficient for accurate analysis: data
should in fact fit the purpose of the study.
Data analysis is by far more problematic than data collection. As risk is de-
termined by a combination of hazard, exposure and vulnerability, any change in
the society, landscapes, or technology might completely reshape the area’s risk
profile. As a consequence, past events might no more be representative of the
area and this questions the possibility of projecting the future from the past, or
at the least, that classical statistical techniques can be used. To overcome these
problems, a new approach to risk assessment, called “catastrophe-modeling”,
10When assessing natural risk a variety of impacts should be considered on different groups
across the society. Impacts might be direct or indirect, as shown by World Bank (2014) for
the government, homeowners, farmers and the poorest.
11As argued by Field et al. (2012), use and applicability of cost-benefit analysis to risk re-
duction measures are constrained by important limitations, that Mechler (2016) summarizes
in: (i) representing disaster risk, (ii) assessing intangibles and indirect benefits, (iii) assessing
portfolios of systemic interventions versus single interventions, (iv) the role of spatial and
temporal scales. Despite these limitations, the author argues that cost–benefit analysis re-
mains an important tool for prioritizing efficient disaster risk measures and is well suited for
the evaluation of infrastructure-based options. By contrast, preparedness and systemic inter-
ventions can be better evaluated by means of other tools such as cost-effectiveness analysis,
multi-criteria analysis and robust decision-making approaches.
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has been developed.12 Catastrophe models are softwares that combine geologi-
cal, engineering, IT and statistical knowledge to simulate the effects of natural
events on the territory.13 These sophisticated tools are widely adopted by the
insurance industry and are increasingly used by governments also.14 These soft-
wares require continuous updating and their developers are constantly striving
to achieve ever more accurate predictions of losses. To date, there are models ca-
pable of describing almost all natural risks, but some important eventualities are
not yet satisfactorily represented, including cascading effects, multi-hazard anal-
ysis, spatial correlation between assets exposed (Mitchell-Wallace et al., 2017).
Furthermore, these models are tied to the characteristics of the areas on which
they are built and might not represent regions that are too different from the
reference area.
3.2 Governance
Currently most countries are addressing the consequences of disasters rather
than trying to reduce their actual risk (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019; UNDRR,
2019). This purely “corrective” attitude15 is the main weakness of disaster
risk management strategies, which should instead define a plan of interventions
aimed at building the skills necessary for the community to face adverse events
or to limit them. However, developing “progressive” disaster risk management is
much more complex than just dealing with consequences. First of all, managers
should move from a single-threat to a multi-threat perspective, recognize the
existence of multiple sources of risk, potentially correlated, and prepare to face
all of them (UNDRR, 2019). Secondly, the manager must prepare a plan of
interventions that should be effective in the long run. For example, in the
12Catastrophe-modelling began in the 1960s, but its adoption is much more recent. The
first commercially-produced model dates back to twenty years later. When introduced, their
use was not widespread. They became increasingly popular in the insurance industry from
1989, when Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta Earthquake caused severe losses to US
insurers, and then Hurricane Andrew in 1992, that led nine insurers to insolvency, furthermore
incentivized their adoption (Grossi et al., 2005). Since the early beginning, insurance industry
has been the most important driver of their development. From the 2000s developers have
started including insurance pricing in the models, and actuarial standards and guidelines for
the use of catastrophe modelling have been published by the actuarial society of both Europe
and the US (Mitchell-Wallace et al., 2017).
13Note that, despite these models simulate the impacts of natural disasters to overcome lack
of data, historical records are still necessary and serve as input for the simulation process.
14The first country in investing in catastrophe-modelling was the US. In 1997 FEMA pro-
duced HAZUS, a catastrophe-model to estimate earthquake losses in the Country. The model
has later been extended to floods and hurricanes. More recently, around the 2010’s, there has
been a large-scale revisions of the existing catastrophe-models and new ones emerged. Some
of these have been produced by governmental organizations, like for example, R-FONDEN in
2007, created through a partnership between the Mexican Natural Disasters Fund (FONDEN)
and the Ministry of Finance with the technical support of the Institute of Engineering of the
UNAM (Universidad Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico) (World Bank, 2012a).
15According to Twigg (2015), corrective risk management are project-oriented strategies
composed by measures that address specific current risks only. As opposed to the corrective
strategy, the progressive disaster risk management is process-oriented and builds a range of
capacities to cope with future threats, both anticipated and unforeseen.
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case of risk mitigation interventions, this means not only to fund the initial
investment, but also to provide for all maintenance activities that will guarantee
its future functioning. Finally, it is essential that the risk management strategy
is included into a broader management plan, so that consistency between the
actions of the various governmental offices will be guaranteed. For example,
it urban development plans should not provide for settlements expansion in
high-risk areas (Rozenberg and Fay, 2019).
This approach is much broader and also much more expensive in terms of
both time and cost than simply fixing the consequences. In addition to the diffi-
culty of planning, other factors negatively influence managers’ choices. Studies
on the relationship between natural disasters and election suggest that it may
not be convenient for a government to invest in disaster reduction. In fact, if
on the one hand the population tends to blame the government for natural dis-
asters (Achen and Bartels, 2004), on the other hand politicians are discouraged
to invest in risk mitigation because electorate has short memory and benefits
from the intervention may take years and may even appear once the ruling party
has changed (Cavallo and Noy, 2009). In addition, Healy and Malhotra (2009)
found evidence that voters reward presidential party for disaster relief but not for
investing in disaster preparedness. This might explain why governments appear
so generous in spending on disaster relief during the election (Cole et al., 2012a).
Along with political pressure, decision-makers might fail to recognize the impor-
tance of hazards and vulnerability to national development, might be excessively
risk-prone or reluctant to allocate substantial resources for events that might
not even happen (Michel-Kerjan and Slovic, 2010; Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019).
4 Toward a Community-Based Risk Management
Approach
As countries slowly revise their plannings, risk evolves quickly: the sheer number
of people on Earth, climate change and the dynamic connectedness of biological
and physical worlds are making natural risks increasingly systemic. Since risk is
the result of individuals and collective decisions, the United Nations warn that,
as risk gets more and more complex, responsibilities cannot be clearly assigned
to the different stakeholders. Governments are able to influence risk-generating
or risk-reducing behaviour in the population, in the private, public and vol-
untary sectors through public policies, hence UNDRR (2019) argues that “by
incentivizing transdisciplinary, integrated, multisectoral research engaging non-
traditional counterparts, risk assessment and decision-making efficiency can be
improved, duplication of effort reduced, and connected collective action facili-
tated. National planning bodies with representation from all sectors must develop
risk reduction strategies that assume an “all-of-State” institutions approach to
risk reduction”.
The United Nations encourage countries to establish solid partnerships both
with private stakeholders and between governments, but, though necessary, they
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can also be difficult to manage. In particular, a United Nations survey on public-
private partnerships for natural risk management UNISDR (2008) revealed that
an active participation of all the community at risk is fundamental for the ef-
fectiveness of a strategy, but it can be achieved only if the government is able
to create the proper conditions. First of all, arousing the interest of the private
sector is necessary, as firms will participate in the initiatives only if they deem
them convenient, and maintain their commitment over time. Since a plurality
of private subjects make up the community, disaster risk management should
be mutually beneficial and local authorities must encourage active and produc-
tive dialogue among the subjects involved (for example, between insurance and
academia). In order to involve private companies, the government can ask them
to develop a project and make them responsible for the parts that compete with
them. Furthermore, the role of individual citizens, who can make an important
contribution if properly informed and involved, should not be overlooked. In
fact, educating the right segment of the population can encourage risk reduction
behaviors, and fosters the dialogue between individuals and authorities. It is
also important that citizens believe in the risk management strategy, so that
they will actively engage in safety and involve more and more people. Trust
between institutions and partners is essential for the success of the strategy and
it is the duty of the government to constantly nourish it (for example by pun-
ishing the fraudulent companies that offer individuals risk reduction goods or
services at excessively high prices), but constant monitoring private partners is
also crucial.
A “community-based disaster risk management”16 raises the voice of peo-
ple that are hence able to better communicate vulnerabilities to the governor,
thus allowing for a more comprehensive view of risk. Understanding the social
context is in fact essential for the construction of effective measures, and it is
particularly important to reach out the weakest segments of the population.17
In particular, Twigg (2015) claims that “participatory risk reduction initiatives
are more sustainable because they build on local capacity, ideas can be tested and
refined before adoption, and they are more likely to be compatible with long-term
development plans. They may also be more cost-effective in the long term than
externally-driven initiatives”. Unfortunately, in Twigg (2011), the author ar-
gues that reality diverges from the desirable scenario of trust, collaboration and
16 World Health Organization (2015) defines a community as “a group of people living in
the same environment, sharing the same livelihood. [...]. Community members are the imme-
diate victims of the adverse effects of disasters and they have the best knowledge about their
local surroundings such as demographic, social, economic and cultural status, risky areas,
water sources, roads and health facilities. In addition community members have informa-
tion about the vulnerable groups [...] and can assist health care”. Community-based disaster
risk management empowers the community, address the root causes of risks and address it
through local knowledge and expertise and for this reason activities and actions vary from
one community to another (Heijmans, 2009).
17 Some studies have shown that the poorests are more vulnerable to natural disasters
due to their limited ability to cope with disasters (Hallegatte et al., 2017). As the impact of
natural disaster on well-being might also be tremendous, other factors impacting vulnerability
are inequalities concerning gender, age, education, ethnicity, wealth, health status, disability,
access to resources and environmental concerns (Hallegatte et al., 2018; Shukla et al., 2019).
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dialogue.
In addition, developing countries could enormously benefit from collabora-
tions between national governments and international institutions such as the
World Bank, which for their part are interested in promoting risk reduction to
contain future expenses (Kunreuther, 2003). Most regions with high exposure
to natural hazards are involved in projects with intergovernmental organiza-
tions coordinating the disaster risk management (UNDRR, 2019), though some
advancement is still needed. On the negative side, sometimes a lack of trust has
hindered collaborative preparedness effort in conjunction with international aid
agencies (Twigg, 2015), and collaboration between national governments should
be strengthened.
5 Final Remarks and Future Challenghes
In 2015, the United Nations declared that natural hazards could erase decades
of progress (United Nations General Assembly, 2015), but development itself
fosters natural hazards. In fact, unsustainable development leads to an increase
in social inequalities and in the number of poor who, because of their limited
resources, constitute the most vulnerable and least resilient segment of the pop-
ulation. In turn, inequalities create social and political exclusion, and since the
participation of the whole community is necessary for risk understanding, this
poses a further obstacle to the effectiveness of the managers’ choices (UNDRR,
2019).
Especially in the poorest countries, development went along with rapid ur-
banization, which has strong impacts on risks. Cities are in fact extremely dan-
gerous due to biological, chemical, physical and socio-political conditions. In
addition, they host large numbers of low-income people who live in low-quality
facilities, sometimes without access to adequate infrastructure. The urbaniza-
tion process, often carried out in an uncontrolled way, has therefore brought
together a large number of extremely vulnerable people in highly risky areas
(Dickson, 2012). In this respect, Hallegatte et al. (2017) registered a global
trend toward increased risk taking: “from 1970 to 2010 the world population
grew by 87 percent, while the population in flood plains increased by 114 percent
and in cyclone-prone coastlines by 192 percent”. The situation aggravates when
appropriate building codes are lacking.
Further consequences of urbanization are damage to the ecosystem and de-
forestation, which can cause the emergence of new natural phenomena, such
as the spread of new diseases (Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019). Climate change
runs faster every year and its consequences are more and more tangible all over
the world. According to Geneva Association (2013, 2018), the changing climate
is challenging the weather-relater branches of the insurance industry. State-
owned insurance and reinsurance companies are particularly fragile since, being
bound by subsidy rules and government choices, are less flexible than private
ones and will not be able to adapt their prices quickly (Penning-Rowsell, 2015;
Olcina et al., 2016; van Oldenborgh et al., 2017). According to Hallegatte et al.
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(2016), climate change could drag up to 100 million people into poverty by
2030, but the financing needs for adaptation in developing countries far exceed
funds available (World Bank, 2010). Country’s reluctance in investing in adap-
tation is largely due to the uncertainty surrounding the projects’ benefits and,
in addition, government undertaking some project may not be well-rewarded
by the population, whose support or opposition is determined by the percep-
tion of danger associated to climate change or to the use of current technolo-
gies (Kunreuther et al., 2014). A first step that governments can take toward
building a more climate-resilient society is encouraging or forcing private initia-
tives through adequate spatial planning frameworks, infrastructure projects and
policy appraisals, regulatory and economic standards (OECD, 2018a). Public-
private partnerships can channel and coordinate the efforts and objectives of
governments and multiple private entities - project companies, lenders, share-
holders, insurers and professional advisors - provided that tasks and responsibili-
ties are clearly assigned (World Bank, 2016). In order for the plan to be effective,
governments should ensure consistency with the other policies adopted which
could otherwise distort the climate-resilient incentives and discourage the adop-
tion of the desired solutions (OECD, 2018a). As argued by the Hallegatte et al.
(2016), we hence need to rapidly switch to inclusive climate-informed develop-
ment.
In light of this, it is increasingly evident that the management of natural
risks cannot be effectively achieved unless included in a sustainable development
plan. UNDRR (2019) warns that “with increasing complexity and interaction of
human, economic and political systems within ecological systems, risk becomes
increasingly systemic. [...]. The way in which such changes – including in the
intensity and frequency of hazards – affect human activity is as yet difficult to
foresee. Current approaches to risk measurement and management are inade-
quate to meet the challenges of the multifaceted interconnectedness of hazard, the
barely understood breadth of exposure, and the profound detail of vulnerability”.
A “development-enhancing risk-management” includes risk reduction in the
development plans, allowing to define a set of coherent actions and thus avoid-
ing those conflicts of interest that have led to a scarce commitment of local
authorities in risk mitigation. Furthermore, it takes into account all the exter-
nalities of a risk reduction measure, some of which may not concern natural
risks (Clarke and Doherty, 2004; Kunreuther, 2006b; OECD, 2018a). A first
step in embracing this comprehensive approach might be incorporating risk re-
duction measures into existing funding streams (Twigg, 2015), for example by
activating a coupled loan and voucher program for homeowners to relocate out
of risk-prone areas (Kousky and Kunreuther, 2014). Governments might also
prevent risk creation and foster mitigation by setting appropriate development-
related standards and regulations, policies on social protection and payment
for ecosystem services. Among financial tools, in addition to traditional rein-
surance and ILS, state-contingent debt instruments can help dealing with the
post-disaster phase, while green bonds can foster climate change adaptation
(Opitz-Stapleton et al., 2019).
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Table 1: State-owned insurance companies (examples).
Country, Name, Year Peril
Position in the
Market
Policy Details Risk Reduction
California,
California Earthquake
Authority1,
1996
Earthquakes
Co-insurance with
private insurers.
California insurers are obliged to
offer earthquake policies, but they
can choose whether to co-operate
with CEA or not. Policy purchase
is voluntary.
Risk-based premium. Possibility to
choose deductibles and maximum
coverage.
Incentives for risk
mitigation
(discounted
premiums),
Reinsurance.
Iceland,
National Catastrophe
Insurance of Iceland2,
1975
Avalanches
Earthquakes
Floods
Landslides
Volcanic eruptions
Private insurers
collect and transfer
premiums, and
receive a
commission.
All buildings and contents insured
against fire are also insured against
catastrophe risks.
Fire insurance is compulsory.
Flat premium set by law.
5% Minimum deductible.
Reinsurance,
If the agency borrows
funds, such loans are
unconditionally
guaranteed by the
government.
New Zealand,
Earthquake
Commission (EQC)3,
1993
Earthquakes
Floods
Hydrotermal activity
Natural landslides
Tsunamis
Volcanic eruptions
Co-insurance with
private insurers.
Specific building cathegory are
covered compulsorily and
automatically along with fire
insurance. If the building is not
insured for fire, is also not covered
for natural risks.
Flat rates. Applies fixed maxima
and deductibles.
Reinsurance,
Unlimited State
guarantee.
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Country, Name, Year Peril
Position in the
Market
Policy Details Risk Reduction
Spain,
Consorcio de
Compensacion de
Seguros4,
1954
Atypical cyclonic storms
Earthquakes
Extraordinary floods
Fall of meteorites
Tsunamis
Volcanic eruptions
Private insurers
collect and transfer
premiums, and
receive a
commission.
Compulsorily included in personal
accident policies, life insurance
and some branches of property
damage.
Flat rates. Deductibles apply to
most for the covers.
Unlimited State
guarantee.
Taiwan,
Taiwan Residential
Earthquake
Insurance Fund5,
2001
Earthquakes
Co-insurance with
private insurers
Compulsorily attached to all
residential fire insurance policies.
Flat rates. Applies maxima.
Reinsurance,
State guarantee.
Turkey,
Turkish Catastrophe
Insurance Pool6,
2000
Earthquakes
Accredited
insurance companies
and agents arrange
policies on behalf
of the TCIP.
Compulsory for certain types of
buildings and dwellings.
Partially risk based rates (5 risk
zone, 3 construction types).
Applies maxima.
Reinsurance,
Contingent Credit
Line.
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Country, Name, Year Peril
Position in the
Market
Policy Details Risk Reduction
U.S.,
National Flood
Insurance Program7,
1968
Floods
Competes with
private insurers.
Residential buildings and contents
policies are offered to those
communities that participate to the
program. Communities’ can
participate to the program but are
not forced. If they do, they
undertake to adopt appropriate
preventive measures. Members of a
community involved are not forced
to buy policies.
Risk-based rates. Applies maxima
and deductibles.
Incetives for risk
mitigation,
Government as
lender of last resort.
1 California Earthquake Authority, Audited Financial Statements 2018.
2 Government of Iceland, ACT 55/1992 on The Natural Catastrophe Insurance of Iceland after changes to NTI‘s legislation in July 2018.
3 New Zealand Government, “Earthquake Commission Act 1993”; Civil Defence – New Zealand, “Government Financial Support”, 2009.
4 Consorcio de Compensacio´n de Seguros (2008, 2017); Machetti (2004).
5 Government of Taiwan, “Insurance Act”, art 138-1, 1999; Government of Taiwan, “Enforcement Rules for Coinsurance and Risk Assumption Mecha-
nism of Residential Earthquake Insurance”, 2001; Government of Taiwan, “Taiwan Residential Earthquake Insurance Fund Articles of Incorporation”,
2001; Government of Taiwan, “Regulations Governing Taiwan Residential Earthquake Insurance Fund”, 2001; Government of Taiwan, “Enforcement
Rules for the Risk Spreading Mechanism of Residential Earthquake Insurance”, 2008; Taiwan Residential Earthquake Insurance Fund (TREIF), Annual
Report 2015.
6 Yazici (2006); World Bank (2011); Gurenko et al. (2006); Turkish Government, Law no: 4452 “Measures to be taken Against Natural Disasters and
Authorization in Regards to Arrangements to be made in Overcoming the Damage Caused by Natural Disasters”, 27/08/1999; Turkish Government,
Decree Law no: 587 “Decree Law Relating to Compulsory Earthquake Insurance”, 27/12/1999; Turkish Government, Law no: 6305 “Catastrophe
Insurance Law”, accepted 09/05/2012; Turkish Government, Tariff and instruction of compulsory earthquake insurance, Official Gazette 28512, 29
December 2012.
7 All-Hazard Authorities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, “The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968” as amended 42 U.S.C 4001
et seq., sec 1366, Office of the General Counsel, August 1997; US Government, “Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000”, Public Law 106-390,30 October
2000; Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration - FEMA, “FY 2016 Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant Program. Fact Sheet”, FEMA,
2016; United States Code, Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare, Chapter 68. Disaster Relief, “Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act”, Public Law 93-288, signed into law 23 November 1988, last amended April 2013.
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Table 2: State-owned reinsurance companies (examples).
Country, Name,
Year
Peril Policy Details Reinsurance Contract Risk Reduction
Florida,
Florida
Hurricane
Catastrophe
Fund1,
1993
Hurricane
Property insurance policies must
include coverage for hurricane.
Policyholders are eligible for
premium discounts for installing
certain wind resistant features
on their homes.
Hurricane policies may include
a deductible.
Insurers are obliged to cede
residential property’s hurricane
risks to the fund. Insurers select
a coverage percentage of 45%,
75%, or 90%. A participating
insurer’s premium, retention, and
coverage limit are based on its
total insured values by ZIP code.
Retrocession.
ILS.
+Post-event bonds.
France,
Caisse Centrale
de Re´assurance2,
1946 (natural
risks cover
from 1982).
Natural events
that the
government
declares
disasters,
except storms,
hail, snow,
frost.
Natural disaster coverage is
compulsory in all property
insurance policies.
Rates are set as percentages of
the premium of the basic
insurance policy.
The Company offers unlimited
cover for specific classes of
business in the French market.
Insurers decide whether to cede
risks to CCR or not.
Guarantee of the French
State.
Risk Prevention Plans.
Continued on next page
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Country, Name,
Year
Peril Policy Details Reinsurance Contract Risk Reduction
Japan,
Japanese
Earthquake
Reinsurance
Co.3,
1966
Earthquakes.
Volcanic
eruption.
Earthquake insurance are
compulsorily written with fire
policies on residential dwellings
and/or personal properties. The
amount insured is 30-50% of
the amount provided by the fire
policy, but is limited to a fixed
maximum. The premium is risk
based and set by law. Discounts
for earthquake-resistant
buildings are available.
JER compensates 100% of the
claim that the insurer paid to the
policyholder. Reserves are made
up of policyholders’ premiums,
capital by the government,
investment profits from these
accumulated liability reserves.
If an event occurs, each of JER,
non-life insurers and the
government pays a claim
according to each liability.
JER and non-life insurers pay
claims up to 87.1 billion yen
per earthquake. The non-life
insurers, the government and
JER share equally claims for
the portion exceeding 87.1
up to 153.7 billion yen. The
government pays a majority
of claims for the portion
exceeding 153.7 billion yen.
JER also buys retrocession.
UK
Flood Re4
2016
Flood
Insures decide whether to offer
a policy or not and set the price.
Flood Re compensates 100% of
the claim that the insurer paid to
the policyholder. Any insurer
that offers home insurance in the
UK must pay a levy to Flood Re.
Insurers can choose to pass the
flood risk to Flood Re for a fixed
price.
Government’s commitment
to risk mitigation.
Flood Re buys its own
reinsurance programme every
three years to cover losses of
up to £2.2bn per annum.
1 Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, Annual Report of Aggregate Net Probable Maximum Losses, Financing Options, and Potential Assessments,
February 2020.
2 Caisse Centrale de Re´assurance, Activity Report 2018.
3 Japan Earthquake Reinsurance, Annual Report 2019, Introduction to Earthquake Reinsurance in Japan.
4 Flood Re, Annual Report and Financial Statements, Year ended 31 March 2019.
3
4
